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NAME-CLEARING HEARINGS: HOW THIS
"REMEDY" FAILS TO SAFEGUARD THE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES ACCUSED OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Chiaman Wang*
INTRODUCTION

Although once reluctant to give credit to sexual harassment
accusations,' courts have become increasingly receptive to sexual
harassment complaints. 2 This change can be partially attributed to the3
Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
which created an affirmative duty on employers to safeguard
employees from sexual harassment.4 In the past ten years alone, over
140,000 sexual harassment complaints have been filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 5 But as the rights of
alleged victims become increasingly protected, an important question

* J.D. 2010, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006). Courts did not recognize sexual harassment as discrimination based on sex until
1976. See generally Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-61 (D.D.C. 1976).
2. Stuart H. Bompey, PracticalProblems in Investigating Sexual Harassment Claims, 426 PLIiLIT
141,145 (1992).
3. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
4. In Meritor, the Supreme Court raised the standard for employers while simultaneously lowering
the standard for employees alleging sexual harassment. Employees could now bring sexual harassment
claims despite an absence of economic or tangible discrimination. Id. at 64. On the other hand,
employers could be liable for a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment despite creating a
grievance procedure and implementing a "no sexual harassment" policy. Id. at 72; see also Bompey,
supra note 2, at 145.
5. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPA's Combined, FY 1997-FY 2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexualharassment.cfin (last visited Apr. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Sexual Harassment Charges]. The number of sexual harassment charges received by the
EEOC and the Fair Employment Practices agencies (FEPA) steadily increased during the 1990's.
Although the numbers have dropped since the early 2000's, the EEOC and FEPA are still receiving over
12,000 charges each year.
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arises: has there been a corresponding decline in the rights of
individuals accused of sexual harassment?
Since Meritor, courts have consistently emphasized the employers'
duty to respond to allegations of sexual harassment with "immediate
and corrective action.",6 The text of Title VII, 7 or more importantly,
the courts' interpretation of Title VII, requires employers to
implement anti-sexual harassment policies "immediate[ly] and
flawless[ly]" to ensure compliance. 8 In response to congressional and
judicial pressures, employers appear to be "protect[ing] the accusing
victim at all costs" 9 and, as a result, are "overzealous[ly]"
disciplining individuals accused of sexual harassment. 10 Without
even a preliminary investigation into the allegations, many employers
take adverse employment actions against the accused to avoid
lawsuits from the accuser.11 Due to the increasingly protected
interests of alleged sexual harassment victims, employers are more
likely to be held liable for a hostile work environment than for
violating the rights of the accused. 12 Consequently, the accused's
6. Smith v. Oakland Scavenger Co., No. CV-94-01354-CAL, 1997 WL 661335, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct.
16, 1997) (quoting Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997));
Ballard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:06CV718, 2008 WL 1990787, at *5 (D. Neb. May 5, 2008); Jew
v. Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 959-60 (S.D. Iowa 1990); see also Bompey, supra note 2, at 145;
Hannah Katherine Vorwerk, The ForgottenInterest Group: Reforming Title VII to Address the Concerns
of Workers While EliminatingSexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1019, 1021-22 (1995).
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
8. Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1021-22.
9. Cynthia Wilson Veidt, Where There's Smoke, There Must Be Fire:Rights of the Accused Sexual
Harasser,19 REv. LITIG. 71, 73 (2000).
10. Veidt, supra note 9, at 74. See Ann Hassenpflug & Robert 0. Riggs, Guilty Until Proven
Innocent? Protecting the Rights of School DistrictEmployees, 104 EDUC. L. REP. 981, 981-84 (1996)
(highlighting several cases in which public school employees suffered adverse employment actions
based on false allegations).
11. Gibson v. Shelly Co., 314 F. App'x 760, 763 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that plaintiff was terminated
before the completion of the investigation into the sexual harassment allegations); Cotton v. Jackson,
216 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11 th Cir. 2000) (stating that the employer suspended the accused without pay and
prohibited him from entering campus just one day after receiving a complaint from the accused); Vanelli
v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the teacher was suspended
upon his arrival at the meeting, prior to any discussion of the allegations against him); see also Veidt,
supra note 9, at 74.
12. A hostile work environment is created when a supervisory employee subjects a subordinate
employee to severe and pervasive sexual harassment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780
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rights appear "non-existent or [are] 3of significantly reduced
importance" in comparison to the accuser.'
However, this trend should not continue. 14 Each year, thousands of
sexual harassment accusations are found to be false. 5 In 2009,
12,696 sexual harassment claims were filed against employers with
the EEOC, but subsequent government investigations showed that
almost half of these complaints lacked merit.1 6 In one year alone,
5,695 individuals made sexual harassment allegations without any
reasonable basis for their claims. 17 Thus, at least 5,695 individuals
were wrongfully accused of sexual harassment. 18
The mere implication of sexual harassment can cause the accused
to suffer substantial repercussions. 19 Allegations of sexual harassment
have a significant, negative effect on all aspects of an accused's
life. 20 Burdened with the label of sexual harasser, the accused carries
an "enormous social stigma' '21 that affects his 22 standing in the
(1998). To shield itself from claims by an alleged victim of sexual harassment, an employer must
provide "immediate and corrective action" to avoid liability for a hostile work environment. Smith v.
Oakland Scavenger Co., No. CV-94-01354-CAL, 1997 WL 661335, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997);
Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997); Ballard v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., No. 8:06CV718, 2008 WL 1990787, at *5 (D. Neb. May 5, 2008); Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 749
F. Supp. 946, 959-60 (S.D. Iowa 1990). This action must be "reasonably calculated" to end the
harassment and to prevent future occurrences of harassment. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517
F.3d 321, 340 (6th Cir. 2008); Magyar v. Saint Joseph Reg'l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 780 (7th Cir.
2008); Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 2007); Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at 1483. In
contrast, to shield itself from claims brought by the accused, the employer need only provide the accused
with notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th
App. Ct. 1987).
Cir. 1986); Zueck v. City of Nokomis, 513 N.E.2d 125, 127-28 (I11.
13. Veidt, supra note 9, at 74.
14. Justice Alan D. Oshrin recognized this need in Starishevsky v. Hofstra University when he stated
that the "process of eliminating sexual harassment must go forward with recognition of the tights of all
involved and without the creation of new wrongs." 612 N.Y.S.2d 794, 796 (1994).
15. Sexual Harassment Charges, supra note 5.
16. Id.
17. Id.Of the 12,510 complaints received by the EEOC, 5,273 were found to have no reasonable
cause (45.5%).
18. Id.
19. Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 988; Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1022, 1050.
20. Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 11, at 988; Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1022, 1050.
21. In re King Soopers, Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
254 (1985) (Sass, Arb.) (stating that it is "not overly dramatic" to say that charges of sexual harassment
put the accused's "life... on the line"); Veidt, supra note 9, at 72.
22. For purposes of clarity, this Note will assign the male pronoun to the accused because most
individuals accused of sexual harassment are male. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
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community, his sense of self, and others' views of him. 23 Indeed,
accusations of sexual harassment24 have been likened to "accusations
of witchcraft in colonial Salem."
This pervasive effect extends from the accused's personal life into
his professional life. 25 For example, ex-Dean of the University of
Georgia, John Soloski states that allegations of sexual harassment
against him "tor[e] down in a matter of hours" the academic and
professional reputation he "spent 30 years building., 26 Once an
individual is suspected of sexual harassment, he may be immediately
fired27 and lose all future employment opportunities in his field.28
The Supreme Court emphasized that the deprivation of present
employment, as well as future
opportunity for public employment,
"certainly is no small injury.' 29
Consequently, courts and employers must strike a balance between
protecting the rights of the accuser and the accused. To do so, they
must ensure that adequate remedies are available to protect the rights
of individuals accused of sexual harassment. This Note surveys
various claims wrongfully accused sexual harassers may bring
against their employers, 30 while focusing on name-clearing
hearings. 3 1 Part I details the remedies currently available; 32 Part II
33
explains the purpose and availability of name-clearing hearings;
U.S. 244 (1994); Cotton v.Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Lee v. City & County of S.F., 203
F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1999); Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982);
Starishevsky v. Hofstra Univ., 612 N.Y.S.2d 794, 796 (1994). However, it is important to note that
females have also been accused of sexual harassment in the workplace. Hicks v. Sheahan, No. 03-C0327, 2004 WL 3119016 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2004); see also Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 659
n.6 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting that "a finding of discrimination could be made where a female supervisor
imposed" the sexual discriminatory practices).
23. Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 981; Veidt, supra note 9, at 72.
24. Veidt, supranote 9, at 72.
25. 1d; Vorwerk,supra note 6, at 1022.
26. Andrea Jones, Ex-Dean Sues UGA Chief Says Name Was Smeared, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June
28, 2006, at B3.
27. Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1022.
28. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972) (finding that a stigmatizing
accusation is likely to deprive the accused of future opportunity for government employment).
29. Id.(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951)).
30. See discussion infra Part I.
31. See discussion infra Parts H-[V.
32. See discussion infra Part I.
33. See discussion infra Part 11.
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Part III explores the inadequacies of name-clearing hearings; 34 and
Part IV concludes with proposed modifications to name-clearing
hearings that may more adequately protect the rights of the accused. 3
I. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WRONGFULLY
ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Once a public employee has been wrongfully accused of sexual
harassment, he has several claims that he may bring against his
38
37
employer. 36 This Note surveys the tort claims of defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 39 and negligent infliction
of emotional distress, 40 focusing primarily on the accused's
constitutional due process claim.4 '
Although an accused may bring several tort claims against his
public employer, he is unlikely to succeed given the protections
afforded to public employers. State or government entities are
generally shielded from tort claims under the cloak of sovereign
the accused's case, he will be
immunity. 42 Thus, despite the merits of
43
claims.
tort
his
on
succeed
to
unlikely
34. See discussion infra Part UI.
35. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. Lee v. City & County of S.F., 203 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1999); Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155
F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998); Parker v. Hous. Auth. of Kan. City, 996 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1993);
Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1989); Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 437 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Del. 2006); Moran v. S. Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., No. 05-1062, 2006 WL 932339 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2006); Cedillos v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety,
No. CIVA SA03CA0427-XR, 2005 WL 589314 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2005); Johnson v. City of Menlo
Park, No. C-98-2858, 1999 WL 551241 (N.D. Ca. July 23, 1999); Motzkin v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 938
F. Supp. 983 (D. Mass. 1996).
37. Some other claims an accused may bring, which are not discussed in this Note, include wrongful
termination, Title V11 disparate treatment, breach of contract, discrimination, and invasion of privacy.
See Lee, 203 F.3d 831; Hennigh, 155 F.3d 1249; Parker, 996 F.2d 311; Moran, 2006 WL 932339;
Wilcoxon, 437 F. Supp. 2d 235; Cedillos, 2005 WL 589314; Johnson, 1999 WL 551241; Motzkin, 938
F. Supp.983.
38. See discussion infra Part I.A.
39. See discussion infra Part I.B.
40. See discussion infra Part I.B.
41. See discussion infra Part I.C.
42. Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2006); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188
F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1999).
43. Naumenko v. United States, 277 F. App'x 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that "plaintiff
must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages" because his
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A. Defamation Claims Against Public Employers
An individual wrongfully labeled as a sexual harasser may bring a
defamation claim against his employer. 44 To succeed on this claim,
the accused must show that his employer, without privilege,
published a false statement about him, thereby causing him damage.45
Although the accused has the right to bring this claim, it is "very
difficult" for an accused to successfully establish a defamation claim
against his employer.46 The difficulty lies in the fact that the burden
rests on the accused to show that his employer made statements that
were "knowingly false or in reckless disregard of the truth. 'A7
B. Intentionaland Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
Against Public Employers
The wrongfully accused may also bring an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim (lIED) or a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim (NIED). 48 To succeed on his lIED claim, the accused
must prove his employer intentionally caused or recklessly
disregarded the probability of causing emotional distress to the
accused. 49 However, the wrongfully accused "almost never" 50
tort claims were barred by sovereign immunity); Sydnes v. United States, 523 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th
Cir. 2008) (finding plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the United States,
"however strong it may be on the merits," barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act); Rector v. United
States, 243 F. App'x 976, 979 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the United States "not subject to suit for libel,
slander, or misrepresentation"); Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric., 468 F.3d 248, 252
(5th Cir. 2006) (finding that § 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act precluded plaintiff from bringing
a libel or slander claim against a department of the United States).
44. See Lee v. City & County of S.F., 203 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1999); Wilcoxon v. Red Clay
Consolidated Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 437 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Del. 2006); Cedillos v. Tex. Dep't of
Pub. Safety, No. CIVA SA03CA0427-XR, 2005 WL 589314 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2005); Motzkin v.
Trs. of Boston Univ., 938 F. Supp. 983 (D. Mass. 1996); see also Bompey, supra note 2; Cynthia L.
Remmers, Sexual Harassment:A Guide to an Employer's Obligations, Liability and Prevention, 1997
A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 7, at 100 (1997); Veidt, supra note 9, at 89-90.
45. Veidt, supranote 9, at 89-90.
46. ld. at 89.
47. Anderson v. Boston Sch. Comm., 105 F.3d 762, 766 (1st Cir. 1997); Wulf v. City of Wichita,
883 F.2d 842, 859 (10th Cir. 1989).
48. See Lee, 203 F.3d 831; Cedillos, 2005 WL 589314; Johnson v. City of Menlo Park, No. C-982858, 1999 WL 551241 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 1999), rev'd in part, 7 F. App'x 712 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Veidt, supra note 9, at 90.
49. Francis C. Amendola et al., Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 57 AM. JUR. 2D
Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 144 (2008).
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succeeds in his lIED or NIED claim because courts generally do not
find the employer's actions sufficiently "outrageous" to find in favor
of the accused. 5 '
C. ConstitutionalDue Process
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 52 The purpose of procedural
due process 53 is to safeguard the accused from "unchecked" and
"erroneous" personnel decisions. 54 Thus, an accused harasser
generally asserts that his procedural due process rights have been
violated based on his employer's inadequate or non-existent
investigation into the sexual harassment complaints. 55 To state a
claim for a violation of procedural due process, the accused must
show "(1) that he has a constitutionally protected interest, (2) that the
government has deprived the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected
interest, and (3) that the particular process the government used to
accomplish the deprivation lacked fundamental fairness., 56 In
50. Veidt, supra note 9, at 90.
51. Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 650 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding defendant's
decision to not reappoint plaintiff was not extreme or outrageous because plaintiff had been accused of
inappropriate behavior); Dendinger v. Ohio, 207 F. App'x 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
lower court correctly entered summary judgment against plaintiff because she failed to establish that
defendant's actions were "extreme or outrageous"); Salinas v. Univ. of Tex. Pan. Am., 74 F. App'x 311,
314 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that summary judgment should be affirmed on plaintiff's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim because defendant engaged merely in "run-of-the-mill employment
actions").
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
53. Although constitutional due process involves both substantive due process and procedural due
process, this Note will not discuss substantive due process. Generally, an accused who has a liberty
interest in freedom from stigmatization does not have a substantive due process claim because "no
substance exists for the liberty interest beyond the procedures that define it." Harvey Brown & Sarah V.
Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. 1983: The Vehicle for Protecting Public Employees' Constitutional Rights, 47
BAYLOR L. REv. 619, 645 (1995). Because substantive due process claims are generally unavailable to
individuals accused of sexual harassment, this Note will focus on procedural due process claims that an
accused may bring.
54. J. Michael McGuinness, ProceduralDue Process Rights of PublicEmployees: Basic Rules anda
Rationalefora Return to Rule-Oriented Process,33 NEw ENG. L. REv. 931, 937 (1999).
55. Veidt, supra note 9, at 82.
56. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 632; accord Tracy M. Loos, Name-ClearingHearings,
GratuitousRemedies, and Common Law Writs of Certiorari-AreThey Worth Their Weight in Gold?,
22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 201, 205 (1997); Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1038-39.
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essence, the accused must show that his government employer failed
to give him a meaningful opportunity to be heard before taking away
his property 57 interest or liberty 58 interest 59 via termination, demotion,
suspension or constructive discharge. 6 °
1. PropertyInterest
In order for an individual to have a property interest in his
61
employment, he must possess a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
This entitlement to employment may be created by statutes,
regulations, or implied promises. 62 An accused commonly establishes
a property interest in his employment through "just cause" language
in his employment contract 63 or via tenure. 64 If an accused can show
that his employer deprived him of a property interest without an
opportunity to be heard, he may not only receive monetary damages,
but he may also be reinstated into his original position. 65 However,
these remedies are not available to the accused whose liberty, not
66
property, interest has been unconstitutionally violated.

57. See discussion infra Part I.C.I.
58. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
59. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 934; Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1032.
60. Loos, supra note 56, at 204.
61. McGuinness, supranote 54, at 942; Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1039.
62. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 941, 945. However, "at-will employees" have no protected
property interest. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Elmore v.
Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005)) ("[The] law is clear that an at-will employee does not have a
legitimate entitlement to continued employment because [he] serves solely at the pleasure of [his]
employer."); Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 874 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[A] person who holds a job from
which he can be removed only 'for cause,' has a protected property interest, while one who can be
removed 'at will' does not.").
63. The addition of this clause in the employment contract indicates that govemment employers may
not terminate the employee without "just cause." This clause gives these government employees job
security in knowing that they may not be discharged without first being provided due process
protections. Salas v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 429 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1076 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (quoting
Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 627 N.W.2d 866, 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) ("An
employee who may be dismissed only for 'just cause' has a property interest in his continued
employment that is protected by the due process clause of the federal constitution. Such an employee is
entitled to the 'full panoply of due-process protections... "' (internal citations omitted)); see also
McGuinness, supra note 54, at 943.
64. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 945, 948-49.
65. Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1041.
66. Id.
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2. Liberty Interest
A constitutional liberty interest includes one's right to have the
freedom to work and earn a living. 67 A government employer violates
the liberty interest of an accused by terminating him while
concurrently publishing stigmatizing comments about the accused.68
The comments about the accused's "good name, reputation, honor or
integrity" 69 must relate directly to the accused's competence as an
employee. 70 Comments damaging the accused's professional
competence have the potential to destroy the accused's "standing and
association in his community" and to exclude the accused from future
employment opportunities. 71 In effect, these types of stigmatizing
comments deprive the accused of the ability to work and earn a
living. 72 To remedy this wrong, the accused can only protect his
interests through name-clearing hearings. 73
II.

NAME-CLEARING HEARINGS

Name-clearing hearings were created to provide the accused with
an opportunity to clear his name in front of an impartial tribunal.74 At
the hearing, the accused should have the opportunity to refute false
allegations of sexual harassment so that he may preserve his future
job prospects. 75 Although name-clearing hearings may provide the
wrongfully accused an opportunity to restore his professional
67. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974); Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch.
Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630 (2d Cir. 1996); Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1989);
Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 641; Loos, supra note 56, at 205.
68. J. Michael McGuinness, Litigating Public Employee Procedural Due Process Claims, 715
PLI/LIT 489, 503 (2004).
69. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); McGuinness, supra note 68, at
503.
70. Donato, 96 F.3d at 631 (quoting Huntley v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 14,
543 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cit. 1976)).
71. Jenny S.Brannan, The Publication Debate in Deprivationof OccupationalLiberty Claims, 47 U.
KAN.L. REv. 171, 187-88 (1998); see also McGuinness, supra note 68, at 504.
72. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 641.
73. Brannan, supra note 71, at 171.
74. Donato, 96 F.3d at 633; Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1270 (1975); Loos, supranote 56, at 207; McGuinness, supra note 68, at 504; Veidt, supranote 9, at 82.
75. Donato, 96 F.3d at 633.
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reputation, 76 this hearing is not afforded to all individuals wrongfully
accused of sexual harassment. 77 The following section will delineate
the requirements necessary to establish a right to a name-clearing
hearing. 78
A. Availability ofName-ClearingHearings to Accused Sexual
Harassers
For an accused to exercise his right to a court-mandated nameclearing hearing, he must first establish the following elements: (1)
he was a public employee stigmatized with a false allegation in
connection with a decision to terminate employment; (2) his
employer publicized or included the stigmatizing charge in his
personnel or other file that may be disseminated to future prospective
employers; and (3) he was denied the opportunity for a meaningful
name-clearing hearing.79
As mentioned above,80 the stigmatizing comments made by the
public employer must go "to the very heart of [the accused's]
professional competence." 81 Although not all negative charges are
stigmatizing, 82 courts have held that "sexual harassment charges
[mar] one's reputation and marketability, [thus] alleged harassers can

76. Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 985; Loos, supra note 56, at 215.
77. Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir. 1992); Rosenstein v. City of
Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 395-96 (5th Cir. 1989); Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 641-42; LAos, supra
note 56, at 205; McGuinness, supra note 68, at 507.
78. See discussion infra Part B.A.
79. Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000); Arrington, 970 F.2d at 1447;
Rosenstein, 876 F.2d at 395-96; Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 777-78 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 641; Loos, supra note 56, at 205; McGuinness,
supra note 68, at 505.
80. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
81. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 631 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Huntley v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N. Y. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 543 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Ci. 1976)).
82. Non-stigmatizing allegations include improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, and
neglect of duty or malfeasance. See Donato, 96 F.3d at 630; Hade v. City of Fremont, 246 F. Supp. 2d
837, 841 (N.D. Ohio 2003); see also Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 642-43; Loos, supra note 56,
at 205.
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usually establish damage of reputation and foreclosure of
8 3
employment opportunity.,
Although the false allegation must be made "in connection" with
the accused's termination, the allegation itself does not have to cause
discharge so long as there exists a relationship between the two
events. 84 Additionally, whether the allegation is false depends upon
the underlying facts, not the finding of sexual harassment.8 5 If the
accused admits to the facts alleged by the accuser, then the accused
has no right to a name-clearing hearing despite disputing the
finding. 86
To satisfy the publication element, the accused must show that his
employer made the stigmatizing reason for his discharge available to
the public. 87 The stigmatizing comment becomes publicized either
when the government employer makes a public statement regarding
the allegations 88 or when the employer places the stigmatizing
comments in the accused's personnel file. 89 Courts have found the
publicity requirement indirectly satisfied when the employer places
the stigmatizing statements in the accused's personnel file because
prospective employers undoubtedly will consult the accused's
previous employment records. 90 However, the publicity element is
not satisfied if the employer keeps the accusations of sexual
only become available
harassment confidential 91 or if the accusations
92
proceeding.
judicial
a
of
during the course

83. Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1039; see also Hade, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 843 ("[S]tatements alleging
that a public employee engaged in certain unspecified conduct involving sexual impropriety or improper
advances are stigmatizing.").
84. Rosenstein, 876 F.2d at 396 n.3 ("The charges must be connected with the discharge but need not
actually cause the discharge").
85. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977); Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1042.
86. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627-28; Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1042. For example, if the accused admits
that he said an allegedly harassing comment like, "that looks great on you," he would not be entitled to a
name-clearing hearing despite the fact that he disputes that his comment was sexual in nature.
87. Brannan, supra note 71, at 172.
88. Id.
89. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 631 (2d Cir. 1996); Brown &
Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 642; McGuinness, supranote 68, at 506.
90. Donato,96 F.3d at 631.
91. Brown & Kerrigan, supranote 53, at 642.
92. Brannan, supra note 71, at 172.
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Before an accused can be "denied the opportunity for a
meaningful name-clearing hearing," 93 he must first request it. 94
However, if the accused does not request a name-clearing hearing or
if he refuses his employer's offer for one, then he waives his right to
a name-clearing hearing. 95 The public employer's duty to make
available the name-clearing hearing is minimal; it need only make
known to the accused that he may have an opportunity to clear his
name upon request. 96 The duty rests on the accused to request or
accept the opportunity for a name-clearing hearing. 97 The following
section of this Note will delineate 98
the requirements needed for a
"meaningful" name-clearing hearing.
B. Minimum ProceduralRequirements Necessary to Satisfy
ProceduralDue Process
In order for the name-clearing hearing to be "meaningful," the
government employer need only provide the accused with "some
form" 99 of notice1 °° and an opportunity to refute the allegations 1° 1 in
02
front of an impartial tribunal. 1
1. Notice to the Accused
An employer provides sufficient notice to the accused if the notice
1
identifies the substance of the charges against the accused. 03
Although the description need not be elaborate, it must be adequate to

93. See discussion supra Part Il.A. para. 1.
94. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 644; McGuinness, supra note 68, at 507.
95. Brown & Kerrigan, supranote 53, at 644; Loos, supra note 56, at 207.
96. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that the government employer need not
initiate the hearing process of its own accord, but need only make known to the accused of its
availability).
97. Brown & Kerrigan, supranote 53, at 644; McGuinness, supra note 68, at 507.
98. See discussion infra Part II.B.
99. Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 1982).
100. Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986); Zueck v. City of Nokomis, 513 N.E.2d
125, 128 (Il. App. Ct. 1987); Loos, supra note 56, at 209-10.
101. Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166; Loos, supra note 56, at 209-11.
102. Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166; Loos, supra note 56, at 209-10.
103. See Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166; Zueck, 513 N.E.2d at 128.
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apprise the accused of the allegations against him. 1°4 The employer
must provide this notice at a reasonable time before the hearing so
05
that the accused may prepare an adequate response.'
2. Opportunity to Be Heard
The accused is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard if
his employer gives him the chance to refute the allegations brought
against him. 10 6 So long as the accused has an opportunity to respond
to the charges, either via a general statement' 0 7 or during testimony at
the hearing, 1 8 this requirement is satisfied.' 0 9
3. Impartial Tribunal
In order for the name-clearing hearing to be meaningful, the
members of the tribunal must be impartial to the charges against the
accused."l 0 Because there is a presumption of fairness and
impartiality of the members of the tribunal, the accused must bring
forth "demonstrations of extrajudicial bias" to overcome this
presumption.11 ' The accused must provide proof of a "personal or
financial stake in the outcome ... or any personal animosity towards
the [accused]" to rebut the presumption of impartiality. 112 Thus, the
involvement of a member of the tribunal in the investigative process
3
alone is insufficient to show that the tribunal lacked impartiality."l
Based on the above analysis, 114 it is clear that the employer's
burden to provide a meaningful name-clearing hearing is minimal,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166; Zueck, 513 N.E.2d at 128.
Zueck, 513 N.E.2d at 128; Loos, supra note 56, at 210.
See Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166.
Loos, supranote 56, at 211.
See Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166.
See Loos, supra note 56, at 211.
Id.
Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166.
Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 780 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id.
See discussion infra Part ll.A-C.
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especially when compared with the burden on5 employers to protect
individuals from a hostile work environment."l
III. FAILURE OF NAME-CLEARING HEARINGS TO SATISFY

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The preceding section merely lists the minimum standards of
name-clearing hearings that will satisfy procedural due process.1 6 At
first glance, it appears the accused's rights may be protected because
he has the opportunity to refute the allegations against him; however,
upon further inspection, name-clearing hearings clearly fail to protect
the due process rights of the accused."17 Courts have failed to provide
a definitive standard for name-clearing hearings." I8 Moreover, the
to
name-clearing hearing does not provide the accused an opportunity 120
9 or to be heard by an impartial tribunal.
accusers'
confront his
Lastly, the failure of name-clearing hearings to provide any
substantial remedy indicates that they are nothing more than a
mirage.121
A. No Definitive Standard
Although courts have described due process as a "flexible"
notion, 122 in the sexual harassment context, they appear to side-step
115. To shield itself from claims by an alleged victim of sexual harassment, an employer needs to
provide "immediate and corrective action" to avoid liability for a hostile work environment. Yamaguchi
v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997); Ballard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No.
8:06CV718, 2008 WL 1990787, at *5 (D. Neb. May 5, 2008). This action must be "reasonably
calculated" to end the harassment and to prevent future occurrences harassment. Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at
1483. In contrast, to shield itself from claims brought by the accused, the employer need only provide
the accused with notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard in front of an impartial tribunal.
Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166; Zueck, 513 N.E.2d at 128.
116. See discussion supraPart I1.
117.
See Loos,supra note 56, at 215.
118. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 935.
119. Loos, supra note 56, at 207.
120. See Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1041.
121. Loos, supra note 56, at 21!.
122. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (noting that due process "is not a technical
conception with a fixed content" but a "flexible" process that "calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands"); Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623,
633 (2d Cir. 1996) (defining due process as a "flexible notion," such that "the procedural protection
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the daunting, but necessary, task of defining procedural safeguards
necessary for name-clearing hearings. 123 In other contexts, the
Supreme Court has declined to provide strict guidelines or formal
procedures' 24 based on the idea that procedural due process
25
challenges should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.1
The lack of established guidelines for a meaningful name-clearing
hearing results in constant re-litigation of "minor factual
distinctions."' 126 This re-litigation places a huge burden on courts,
taxpayers, public employers, and public employees. 127 Although this
economic burden is of great significance, the greatest injustice lies in
the disparity of application. 128 This "ad hoc, unprincipled
decisionmaking"' 129 leaves public employers and public employees in
a state of "grave uncertainty" as to what procedures they must
undergo and expect.' 30 Because no formal procedures exist to instruct
employers of their duty to provide meaningful hearings,' 31 informal
business meetings may be sufficient to satisfy procedural due process
for an individual burdened with the ghastly label of "sexual
132
harasser."

accorded a constitutional interest is determined by reference to the particular circumstances of a given
case").
123. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 935.
124. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
125. Donato, 96 F.3d at 633; McGuinness, supra note 54, at 935.
126. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 964.
127. Id. at 962.
128. Id. at 935.
129. Id. at 964.
130.
In Vanelli v. Reynolds School DistrictNo. 7, the court found due process satisfied when the
accused was given an opportunity to retain an attorney and cross-examine all the witnesses. 667 F.2d
773, 780 (9th Cir. 1982). However, that court declined to determine whether the accused should always
have a right to cross-examine complaining witnesses. Id. at 780 n. 11. In Boston v. Webb, plaintiff was
not given the opportunity to cross-examine the accuser or witnesses; however, he was able to retain
counsel and present witnesses. 783 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986). In Wagner v. Tuscarora School
District,the court found due process satisfied when the accused was given an opportunity to "present his
own witnesses and confront his accusers." 225 F. App'x 68, 71 (3d Cir. 2007). However, the court made
no mention about the accused's right to representation by an attorney. See id.; see also McGuinness,
supra note 54, at 935.
131. McGuinnes, supra note 54, at 935.
132. Id.at 211.
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B. No Right to Confront Accusers

Another deficiency with the current name-clearing hearings lies in
the accused's inability to confront his accuser.' 33 Sexual harassment
claims provide "difficult problems of proof' and resolution of these
claims rests greatly on the credibility of the accused and the
accuser. 134 Although an accused sexual harasser has the "opportunity
to be heard,"' 135 from the start, he will likely appear less credible than
the accuser due to the charge alleged. In trial, the accused generally
36
has the opportunity to confront his accuser to attack the truth of her'
testimony. 137 However, no similar opportunity exists in nameclearing hearings. 138 The accused has no opportunity to demonstrate
the accuser's potential lack of credibility.' 39 Despite this shortfall,
courts have found name-clearing hearings conducted in this manner
0
sufficient to satisfy procedural due process.14

133. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 643-44.
134. In re King Soopers, Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
254 (1985) (Sass, Arb.).
135. McGuinness, supranote 54, at 934.
136. More males than females are accused of sexual harassment. See cases cited supra note 22.
Correspondingly, more females than males make accusations of sexual harassment. See Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2000);
Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982); Starishevsky v. Hofstra Univ., 612
N.Y.S.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). Additionally, it should be noted that sexual harassment
allegations may be made against members of the same sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (finding that Title VII does not bar sexual harassment claims merely because
"the plaintiff and the defendant.., are of the same sex"); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6
(D.D.C. 1976) ("[A] finding of discrimination [could] be made if the supervisor were a homosexual...
[and] if the supervisor were a bisexual .. "); see also Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2002); Kelleher v. Bank of the West, No. 07-1002-HA, 2008 WL 3853367 (D. Or. Aug. 14,
2008); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
137. See FED. R. EviD. 801.
138. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 643-44.
139. See id.
140. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 510, 534 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
name-clearing hearing "clearly comports with the due process required by the law of our land" despite
plaintiff not having the opportunity to confront his accusers); Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1986) (finding the right to confront one's accuser should be granted only when the constitutional
interest implicated was a "fundamental one of property in continued employment or other entitlement,
Uor of liberty from forced confinement or other physical restraint"); Wagner v. Tuscarora Sch. Dist.,
No. 1:04-CV-1133, 2006 WL 167731, at *7 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2006) (noting that, given the
circumstances, plaintiff was not entitled to "more process than was provided" despite defendant
withholding the names of the accusers and refusing plaintiff the opportunity to confront them).
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C. No Right to an ImpartialTribunal
At first glance, the accused's "opportunity to be heard" appears to
protect his due process rights.14 1 But how do name-clearing hearings
protect the rights of the accused when the individuals presiding over
the name-clearing hearing are the same individuals who wrongly
labeled him a sexual harasser? The name-clearing hearing process is
clearly deficient when the "tribunal that originally terminated the
142
employee's position . . . conducts the name-clearing hearing."'

Despite the "ultimate decisionmaker['s]" involvement in the
investigative proceedings, courts have found that this involvement
has no effect on the impartiality of the tribunal. 143 In fact, courts will
only find impartiality when the accused overcomes the presumption
that government officials act "conscientiously and fairly." 144 The
accused must provide proof of a "personal or financial stake in the
outcome.. .or any personal animosity towards the [accused]" to rebut
the presumption of impartiality.' 45 However, courts miss a very
important point: the accused asks for a name-clearing hearing
because of his belief that he has been wrongly labeled a sexual
harasser; thus, one can clearly infer that the accused does not trust the
individual(s) that have branded him as such. To have those same
individuals take part in the name-clearing hearing clearly fails to
protect the accused's liberty interest.

141. See Veidt, supra note 9, at 82; Vorwerk, supranote 6, at 1041.
142. Loos, supra note 56, at 211.
143. Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166 ("[The] due process requirement of an impartial tribunal [was] not
violated simply because the ultimate decisionmaker was involved in an earlier stage of investigative or
administrative proceedings." (emphasis added)); Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773,
779 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that prior participation in the termination proceeding, "without more,"
failed to show a lack of impartiality).
144. Boston, 783 F.2d at 1166.
145. Vanelli, 667 F.2d at 780 n.10. The court in Vanelli likened prior participation of investigators in
the tribunal to judges re-hearing their own decision after reversal and remand. Id. However, unlike lower
court judges who must follow the orders of judges from higher courts, there exists no corresponding
check on investigators sitting on the name-clearing hearing tribunal.
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D. No Substantive Remedy
Name-clearing hearings do not provide any substantive remedies
for the accused who successfully establishes the falsity of the
allegations against him. 146 Unlike traditional tort remedies, nameclearing hearings do not provide a remedy that "compensates or
makes [the accused] feel whole.' 47 Despite the potential that the
false accusations have been widely disseminated, there exists no
corresponding remedy to repair the damage to the accused's
reputation. It is likely that only the individuals present at the hearing
will ever know the results of the name-clearing hearing. 148 As a
result, the stigma of being labeled a sexual harasser tends to remain
with the accused.149
Moreover, name-clearing hearings provide no opportunity for the
accused to regain employment. 50 Even if the accused successfully
proves the falsity of the stigmatizing statements, his employer has no
obligation to rehire him.151 Additionally, the accused is not entitled to
of work missed due to
any back-pay for days, months, or even years
52
the false allegations of sexual harassment. 1
The flaws in the name-clearing hearing described thus far indicate
that the procedural protections provided by name-clearing hearings
54
are illusory. 153 Without any clear procedural guidelines,1
opportunities to confront the accuser, 155 opportunities to be heard by
an impartial tribunal, 156 or any substantive remedies, the nameclearing hearing merely offers the wrongfully accused the
57
opportunity to be heard.'

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Loos, supra note 56, at 215.
Id.
Id.
Veidt, supra note 9, at 72.
See Loos, supranote 56, at 209.
Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1996).
Loos, supra note 56, at 215.
Id.
MeGuinness, supra note 54, at 935.
Brown & Kerrigan, supranote 53, at 643-44.
Loos, supra note 56, at 211.
Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1041.
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UPDATING THE NAME-CLEARING HEARING TO BETTER PROTECT

AN EMPLOYEE'S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

Currently, the concept of a name-clearing hearing is so nebulous
158
that the accused does not know what to expect from the process.
This lack of clarity affects not only the accused, but also his
employer, the accuser, and ultimately, the courts. 159 To remedy this
problem, courts should establish specific procedural guidelines to be
followed by employers dealing with workplace sexual harassment
accusations. 160 In addition to the minimum right to notice and the
opportunity to be heard, 16 1 the accused should also be entitled to (1)
confront his accuser,1 62 (2) be heard by164an impartial tribunal, 163 and
(3) have access to substantive remedies.
A. Confront the Accuser
As mentioned above,' 65 the accused currently does not have the
right to confront his accuser at the name-clearing hearing. 166 Courts

should include the right to confront the adversarial party in nameclearing hearings to provide the accused an opportunity to challenge
the accuser's testimony. 167 This opportunity would allow the accused
to demonstrate his accuser's lack of credibility so that he may
exonerate himself. This right to confrontation is especially important
when factual disputes exist because the accused needs an opportunity
to bring attention to any flaws or falsities in his accuser's
allegations.

16 8

158. McGuinness, supra note 54, at 964.
159. Id.
160. See generally Friendly, supra note 74, at 1279-1295; Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at
987-88; Loos, supra note 56, at 211; McGuinness, supra note 54, at 963.
161. Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 395, 400 (5th Cir. 1989); Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d
1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986); Zueck v. City of Nokomis, 513 N.E.2d 125, 128 (I1. App. Ct. 1987).
162. Friendly, supra note 74, at 1282; McGuinness, supranote 54, at 963.
163. Friendly, supra note 74, at 1279; McGuinness, supranote 54, at 963.
164. See generally Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 987.
165. See discussion supraPart ILI.B.
166. Brown & Kerrigan, supra note 53, at 643-44; Loos, supra note 56, at 207.
167. Hassenpflug & Riggs, supranote 10, at 985.
168. See id.
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B. Impartial Tribunal
Not only should the accused have the opportunity to confront his
accuser, 169 but he should also be able to plead his case to a tribunal
comprised of truly impartial individuals. 170 Currently, courts do not
find impartiality breached when an individual involved in the initial
investigative process sits on the tribunal. 171 This presumption of
impartiality is unwarranted and extremely prejudicial for the accused.
The accused should be afforded the opportunity to present his case in
front of an unbiased tribunal comprised of individuals who are
independent of the investigative process and who have no vested
interest in the outcome of the name-clearing hearing. 172 Without this
opportunity, the name-clearing hearing will remain an illusory
attempt to protect the accused's right to due process.
C. Substantive Remedies
Lastly, name-clearing hearings should provide the accused sexual
harasser with actual, substantive remedies. Current name-clearing
hearings provide no true remedies for the accused harasser.'73 To
ensure that these hearings genuinely clear the names of accused
sexual harassers, the result of the name-clearing hearing should be as
widely distributed as the publication of the false accusations. 174 The
extent of the remedy would depend on the extent of publicity given to
the false accusations. 175 In situations where the employer included the
false accusation in the accused's personnel file, the employer would
176
remedy the issue by removing any reference to the charge.
Additionally, the employer would include a letter of exoneration and
77
provide a letter of apology to the accused. 1

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

McGuinness, supra note 54, at 963.
Friendly, supra note 74, at 1279; McGuinness, supra note 54, at 963.
Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986).
Friendly, supra note 74, at 1279.
Loos, supra note 56, at 211.
Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, in situations where the employer extensively
disseminates the false charges, the above remedies would be
insufficient to clear the name of the accused. 178 When the employer
highly publicizes the false accusations, the accused's reputation is "so
tarnished" that a more extensive remedy is necessary to clear his
name. 179 In those circumstances, the employer should provide a
public apology to the accused. 180 A high ranking individual in the
agency or institution should write the letter to be published in the
local newspaper or professional journal. 18 1 Only when additional
guidelines or remedies are attached to name-clearing hearings will
these hearings truly protect the procedural due process rights of
individuals wrongfully accused of sexual harassment.
CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, 182 it is evident that the current
framework for name-clearing hearings provides questionable due
process protection to individuals wrongfully accused of sexual
harassment. 183 Each year, thousands of employees are wrongfully
accused of sexual harassment, 184 but no substantive remedy is
available for these individuals. 185 Allegations of sexual harassment
have an overwhelmingly negative effect on those wrongfully
accused. 186 This effect pervades both their professional and personal
lives187-the stigma of sexual harassment allegations is extremely
existing law provides inadequate relief for
difficult to unglue, and the 88
accused.1
.those wrongfully

178. See id.
179. See Hassenpflug & Riggs, supranote 10, at 987.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See discussion supra Part I-IV.
183. Loos, supra note 56, at 215.
184. Sexual Harassment Charges, supranote 5.
185. Loos, supra note 56, at 215.
186. Veidt, supra note 9, at 72; Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1021-22.
187. Veidt, supra note 9, at 72; see also Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 988; Vorwerk, supra
note 6, at 1021-22.
188. Veidt, supra note 9, at 72; Vorwerk, supra note 6, at 1022.
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It may appear on first glance that the rights of individuals accused
of sexual harassment are protected through the availability of nameclearing hearings. However, as discussed above, 189 these hearings are
available only in limited circumstances, after the accused has
established a prima facie case of wrongful allegation. 190 Moreover, a
name-clearing hearing is itself an incomplete remedy because it does
not provide those wrongfully accused with any substantive relief.191
192
Additionally, because of the "flexible" nature of the proceedings,
the legal setting is fraught with uncertainty-neither the accused nor
his employer knows what steps are due to make the hearing
"meaningful."' 93 Even if an employer desires to provide the accused
with a fair name-clearing hearing, it may be unable to do so given the
lack of available legal guidelines.
This Note has investigated various feasible methods of improving
the process' 94 so that an employee wrongfully accused of sexual
harassment may have the chance to adequately protect his rights and
reputation. By setting a clear standard for name-clearing hearings,
courts would alleviate a significant number of disputes, both inside' 95
and outside the courtroom. 196 Moreover, the overall process would be
more fair for the wrongfully accused-not only would he then know
what to expect from the process, but should he contest the process, he
would also know the likely result in court as well.
Additionally, courts should remove the presumption of fairness for
19 7
investigators who sit on the tribunal at name-clearing hearings.
These individuals clearly have a vested interest in the result of the
hearings. In order for the name-clearing hearing to go in favor of the
accused, the investigator on the tribunal would have to admit to
committing an error. Given the investigator's clear interest in
189. See discussionsupra Part H.A.
190. See discussion supra Part I.A. for the elements an accused must establish before being able to
have the right to a name-clearing hearing.
191. Loos, supranote 56, at 215.
192. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1996).
193. McGuinness, supranote 54, at 935.
194. See discussion supraPart IV.
195. McGuinness, supranote 54, at 962.
196. Id. at 935.
197. Friendly, supra note 74, at 1279; McGuinness, supra note 54, at 963.
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maintaining status quo, courts should remove the presumption of
fairness and prohibit investigative personnel from sitting on the
tribunal.' 98
Lastly, courts should provide the accused a meaningful,
substantive remedy for the wrong done to him. The accusation of
sexual harassment is no small claim1 99 because this allegation has an
overwhelming and pervasive effect on the wrongfully accused's
life.2°0 Consequently, he should be provided a substantive remedy for
this substantial wrong. The accusations should be completely
removed from the accused's personnel file 20 1 and, if the allegations
have been widely publicized, the accused's employer should provide
a public apology. 202 This public apology should be disseminated to
the same extent as the false allegations against the accused. 20 3 Only if
the benefit of the remedy meets the extent of the wrong will the
accused have the chance to return to his life, free from false
allegations of sexual harassment.
To better safeguard the rights of the wrongfully accused, the courts
must provide some additional protection for these individuals. If the
current standard for name-clearing hearings remains the same, the
rights of the accused will receive only minimal constitutional due
process protection.

198. See discussion infra Part III.C.
199. See Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 988; Veidt, supra note 9, at 72; Vorwerk, supra note
6, at 1022.
200. See Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 988; Veidt, supra note 9, at 72; Vorwerk, supra note
6, at 1022.
201. Hassenpflug & Riggs, supra note 10, at 987.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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